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Summary
In this paper we try to bridge the gap between the outcome ambitions of competition policy in
terms of welfare gains and consumer surplus and the longer term effects of competition policy on
growth and employment. First of all, an overview is given of the different definitions of welfare.
We explain why maximising the consumer surplus is an important part of the mission statement
for most competition authorities. In the second part of the paper we estimate the impact of the
introduction of the competition law on economic development. The effects of antitrust policies,
merger control and energy regulation on the consumer surplus appear substantial. This increase
in consumer surplus can be interpreted as a cut in the “market power wedge” which, from a
modelling point of view, is comparable to a cut in the tax wedge. A model simulation for the
Netherlands shows that the economy responded positively to this increase in the consumer sur-
plus. We find that production has grown by an extra 0.5% and that employment has increased by
0.4% as a result of the enforcement of the Competition Law.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The effects of competition policy on economic performance and the effective-
ness of enforcing the competition law are the subject of increasing attention.
Policy makers are interested in the effects of competition policy, deregula-
tion and privatisation on economic performance, growth and employment.1
They also want information on the effectiveness of enforcing the competition
law by competition authorities. As it is much easier to calculate the costs of
∗ Corresponding author: Netherlands Competition Authority, P.O. Box 16326, 2500 BH
The Hague, The Netherlands; e-mail: J.vanSinderen@nmanet.nl
∗∗ The authors are respectively Chief Economist of the NMa and senior advisor at the Office
of the Chief Economist of the NMa. This paper is the background paper for the presentation
with the same title at the conference “Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law
Enforcement”, held in The Hague, 17 and 18 October 2007. The authors would like to thank
two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.
1 See e.g. the study published by the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the economic impact
of privatization of sectors (Ministry of Economic Affairs (2008)).
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the competition authorities than the benefits of competition law enforcement,
politicians tend to conclude that authorities are expensive while the gains of
such institutions are disputable. Therefore a growing number of competition
authorities feel the need to quantify the impact of antitrust policies and mer-
ger control on the economy.2 Sometimes the goals of an authority are rela-
ted to the outcome of these calculations. For instance, the UK Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) formulated a goal that the consumer savings obtained by OFT
intervention should be 5 times the amount the tax payer has to pay for the
authority on a yearly basis (OFT (2005, 2007a)). The US Department of Jus-
tice (US DoJ) is obliged to present annual outcome figures under the Govern-
ment Performance and Result Act.3 The EU also publishes outcome figures
which are based on the fines paid by infringers of the competition law. The
Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) publishes data on the outcome of
law enforcement and sector control in its annual reports and other publica-
tions.4 These outcome calculations are used both to legitimise the spending
of taxpayers’ money and as a management tool.
Most competition authorities concentrate on the effects of competition
policy on consumer surplus. Maximising consumer surplus is often part of
the mission statement of many competition authorities. When calculating the
impact on consumer surplus, the authorities distinguish between the effects of
merger control, antitrust policies and the effects of sector specific regulation.
However, these outcome calculations only give a rough picture of what a com-
petition authority has accomplished in economic terms and more particularly
it only focuses on the short term and static effects.
Although calculations on the effects of competition law enforcement
became common practice among several competition authorities during the
last decade, scepticism about the reliability of these exercises within the eco-
nomic profession is still widespread.5 For instance, Nelson and Sun (2001)
discuss the methods and assumptions used by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and US DoJ to calculate the effects of the interventions. They argue
that the assumptions might not always be that conservative and that there
might be negative deterrence effects too. Furthermore, they warn that rough
estimates might be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the authorities for a
year to year comparison or as an indicator of the relative effectiveness of the
2 This is increasingly complemented with a calculation of the effects of sector specific control.
In the Netherlands until recently this was especially the case with the effectiveness of Energy
and Telecommunication regulation.
3 For a description of the methods used to calculate the figures, see Werden (2008) and
Nelson and Sun (2001).
4 See van Sinderen (2006, 2007) and van Sinderen and Kemp (2008).
5 See for instance Crandall and Winston (2003) as critical academics and the reaction of
Werden (2003) and Baker (2003) on the paper of Crandall and Winston. See also Bergman
(2008) in this issue for a critical assessment.
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authorities. They argue that these calculations are too rough and unreliable
for these purposes. At the conference on “the effectiveness of competition law
enforcement”, almost all speakers from both sides of the Atlantic thought
that quantification of the possible economic effects of interventions by com-
petition authorities should be seen as approximations and should not be used
for other purposes than to get a rough idea about the economic effects of
competition law enforcement.
For politicians and policy makers, competition is not a goal per se but
a means to stimulate more efficiency, which contributes to growth, producti-
vity and consumer welfare. New products or improved production processes
should contribute to a better price-quality ratio. Furthermore, politics is also
concerned about general interests, quality, access to facilities and employ-
ment. These issues are the main objectives of research in the study of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs (2008) on the effects of competition policy of
the last decades.
This study explores the impact of competition policy on consumer surplus
and the effects of the introduction of more competition on the economy as
a whole. Given the needs of politicians and policy makers in evaluating the
outcomes of competition policy and competition law enforcement, these more
macro-economic variables such as growth, productivity and employment are
important policy variables. We therefore estimate the effect of competition
policy on growth and employment in the medium and long term. We model
the relationship between the micro-economic static outcome of the effects
of competition policies in terms of consumer surplus and the medium and
long term dynamic macro-economic effects of such interventions in terms of
growth and employment change. We follow the well known phenomenon in
economic literature on imperfect competition that taxes create a wedge bet-
ween price and marginal costs in the same way that market power creates
such a wedge. In order to quantify the outcome of a policy that stimulates
competition, we use a well tested model called MESEMET-2 (van Sinderen
and Donselaar (2000)) in which a tax wedge between gross and net income
is part of the modelling device. Using this device, we introduce a wedge on
labour income caused by market power (the “market power wedge”).
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will discuss the mea-
surement of welfare and how the choice of consumer surplus as a measure
of the effectiveness of a competition authority must be considered. We will
concentrate on the goals of the NMa and how to judge these goals in the
context of the effectiveness of law enforcement. Section 3 provides an over-
view of different studies on the effect of introducing more competition in
market economies. In Section 4, we will describe current outcome calcula-
tion at the NMa. In this section, we will present the interaction between
the micro-oriented outcome calculations of the NMa between 1998 and 2007
and the macro-economic effects in the longer term. This allows us to draw
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conclusions on the short term and long term effects of competition law enfor-
cement. In Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
2 THE MEASUREMENT OF WELFARE
When studying the economic effects of competition law enforcement, it is
important to look at the objectives of competition law and the criteria to be
used to evaluate its effects. Competition law is primarily concerned with eco-
nomic efficiency and with overall social welfare. However, competition autho-
rities not only pursue this economic efficiency goal in isolation, they also try
to ensure that consumers get a fair share of the economic benefits of markets
working properly and economic and technical progress. Because a total wel-
fare standard does not automatically result in a ‘fair’ share for consumers, the
competition authority needs to use another welfare standard which can allow
for a redistribution of the benefits between the consumers and producers. A
discussion on the selected welfare standard is therefore important because the
selection of the welfare standard affects decisions in the enforcement of the
competition rules.
From an economic perspective, the competition law is a means to make
markets work and achieve economic efficiency. As such, from an economic
perspective, the choice of a total welfare standard generates the most for
society as a whole because it takes into account both allocative and produc-
tive efficiency. This total welfare standard, in line with the Chicago school,
treats the distribution of wealth between consumers and producers neutrally.
From a political point of view, however, this total welfare standard can create
undesirable solutions.6 For instance, a decision to allow a merger that gene-
rates substantial greater gains for business and losses to consumers may be
efficient in terms of a total welfare standard, but not from a political pers-
pective. It is therefore unlikely that competition authorities will adopt this
policy. In fact, increasing consumer welfare is the common goal of competi-
tion authorities (see van Sinderen and Kemp 2008, p. 292). Consumer welfare
in this case can be defined as the degree to which consumers benefit by being
able to buy a product for a price that is less than they would be willing to
pay. Under standard assumptions, consumer welfare is maximised in a situa-
tion of perfect competition. However, the standard assumptions often do not
apply and in evaluating the effect of competition policy, the situation without
a cartel or merger is compared with a situation with no cartel or merger and
not with perfect competition per se. Given prevailing market characteristics,
6 Even a redistribution of surplus within a group of consumers or a group of producers is
not non-normative. For instance, a redistribution from low income households to high income
households may not be appreciated in a political context.
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consumer welfare will not always be maximised after an action of the com-
petition authority, but it may have increased.
In a consumer welfare standard, a transfer from consumers to producers
will not be seen as an improvement but as harmful, even if total welfare is
improved. With a consumer welfare standard in mind, many decisions still
have to be taken such as: how to weight the short term and long term effects
of interventions; how to balance a reduction in producer’s surplus and invest-
ments in innovation etc.
One extreme is a standard which only recognises immediate and short term
consumer interests. Short term profits for producers (as a result of market
power) at the expense of consumers which will be used to reduce production
costs (and lower prices) in the long run will not be valued in this perspective.
On the other hand, consumer welfare could also be interpreted as an essen-
tial long term goal where the immediate interests of consumers are subordi-
nate to the economic welfare of society as a whole. The idea is that at some
point consumers will receive a fair part from the producer’s innovation and
efficiency gains. This perspective requires a prediction on long-term competi-
tiveness in a market: how long can the time-lag be between the implementa-
tion of a merger and the realisation of efficiency gains for consumers, i.e. the
dilemma between static and dynamic efficiency.
In all these cases, the evaluation of (potential) efficiencies that may result
from certain behaviour of companies (merger, vertical relations etc.) is crucial.
Also the weights given to different groups (consumers versus producers) are
critical. This implies a normative view on the proper welfare weights is requi-
red.
In this section we will discuss the selection of the welfare standard in more
detail, particularly from a merger control perspective.
In this context of mergers, Renckens (2007, pp. 155–157) gives five different
possibilities for measuring welfare which also take into account the possibili-
ties of efficiency gains.
• price standard;
• consumer surplus standard;
• Hillsdown standard;
• weighted surplus standard;
• total surplus standard.
In the price standard, a merger will generally be blocked if the merger pro-
duces an increase in prices. Even if efficiency advantages might be proven, the
merger will be blocked because of the negative impact of the price increase on
consumer welfare. Efficiencies are not taken into account in this standard.
The consumer surplus standard is an addition to the price standard. Toge-
ther with the price standard, only the effects of the merger on consumer wel-
fare are studied. Efficiencies are taken into account to evaluate expected price
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changes. In the consumer surplus standard, a merger can be approved if it
creates efficiencies which result in a price decrease reflecting the efficiency
gains despite the potential increase in market power, i.e. there is no net reduc-
tion in consumer surplus. At least some of the cost savings should be pas-
sed on to consumers in the form of lower (or not higher) prices. Therefore
in these cases, the prices will be lower and consumer surplus will increase.
Consumer surplus can also increase if prices rise as long as consumers bene-
fit from the merger in another way, e.g. by better quality, better service or
the introduction of new products. Thus if a merger leads to higher prices in
the first place, but consumers will be better off in the medium term (nota-
bly because of an improvement in the ratio between price and quality), then
a merger can pass because of the gains of improved quality which are pas-
sed on to the consumer. This can also be seen as an outward shift of the
demand curve where consumers’ willingness to pay increases because of the
higher quality.
In the price and consumer welfare standard, efficiencies are not taken into
account to compensate potential loss of consumer surplus. The producer sur-
plus is valued at zero. In the Hillsdown standard, which was named after the
Canadian Hillsdown case,7 producer efficiencies are taken into account. The
transfer of surplus from the consumer to the producer is considered an accep-
table cost of the merger because of the resulting efficiency gain. The efficiency
gains however must be larger than the total loss in consumer welfare (the sur-
plus transferred plus the deadweight loss). Under this standard, a merger can
pass even if it results in higher prices for consumers. The interest of the pro-
ducer as an entity by itself is recognised (in the form of an increase in the
producer surplus resulting from efficiency gains), but it gives no weight to the
increase in producer surplus resulting from a transfer from consumers (Bian
and McFetridge (2000)).
The weighted surplus standard is linked to the Hillsdown standard. The
difference is that, under this standard, the policymakers give relative weights
to the importance of the consumer and producer surplus, i.e. the producer
surplus is taken into account to a certain extent. The weights could depend
on the interpersonal comparison of welfare. This requires value judgements
made by policymakers.
The total surplus standard looks at the change in the total surplus. If the
total surplus increases, a merger will increase total utility and also total wel-
fare. In that case, a merger improves welfare and will be accepted by the
7 Canada versus Hillsdown Holding Canada (1992 41 CPR (3d) 289.) In this case the court
states that both the distribution of wealth and the deadweight loss should be weighted to each
other. A weighting of the deadweight loss alone – as the Canadian Competition Law states –
is considered too limited.
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authority. The distribution of utility between consumers and producers is no
longer relevant.8 Some standards are easily formalised (Renckens (2006)):
Utility index = Consumer Surplus + α Producer Surplus
(If α = 0 we have the consumer surplus standard; if α = 1 we have the total
surplus standard; if 0<α <1 relatively more weight is given to the consumer
surplus; if α > 1 more importance is given to the producer surplus).
The increasing focus on the different measures of welfare is related to the
increasing importance of economic arguments as a basis for judging compe-
tition cases. A change is observable from a “rules per se” towards a “rules
of reason” approach.9 In the latter case, economic principles play a more
dominant role than purely legal arguments.10 This change in focus can be
observed in the improved economic analysis in the assessment of competition
cases (Neven (2006)). A consequence of this development is that most com-
petition authorities have appointed a Chief Economist. Also the adjustment
of the EC Merger Regulation 2004 initiated more discussion on welfare ana-
lyses in merger cases, at least in the context of the judgement of possible effi-
ciency improvements. Because of this change in approach in merger cases, it
is necessary to make the goals of competition policy more explicit, i.e. it is
important to define the welfare measures to be used. Economists agree that
in general the total utility concept is preferable to the consumer surplus as
such (Heyer (2006)). However, in order to maximise total utility, in many
cases competition authorities have to concentrate on maximising consumer
welfare (Farrell and Katz (2006)). This has to do with information asymmetry
8 If some parties loose and other parties gain, also the total surplus standard implies value
judgments because it requires interpersonal utility comparisons. The total surplus standard is
similar to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, which states that total welfare is considered to have
increased when the gains of the winners are sufficiently large to compensate the losers for their
losses (even if such compensation does not in fact take place).
9 See a document by the Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy on article 82
(EAGCP (2005)).
10 Christiansen and Kerber (2006) deal with the advantages and disadvantages of both
approaches. They state that a ‘per se rule’ tends to be a less costly form of enforcing com-
petition law because less research is needed, there is less lobbying, less information asymme-
try between the competition authority and the parties involved and less juridical uncertainty.
A ‘rule of reason’ approach has the advantage that the risk of making type I and type II
errors is reduced. However a disadvantage is that decisions by the competition authority will
become less predictable. There is also a danger of continuous law suits and appeals. It becomes
more rewarding for parties to mislead or at least misinform the authorities. Christiansen and
Kreber conclude that a differentiated approach is necessary. In some cases, a “rule per se”
approach should be used, in other cases a “rule of reason” approach. The choice between
both approaches is affected by the specific market characteristics. For instance, in technologi-
cal markets some competition principles might be more time dependent (see Boone (2008)).
Economic analyses are necessary to make the distinction between different cases.
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between parties and uncertainties. First of all, many of the expected and
projected benefits of mergers are uncertain. According to studies by Schenk
(2005, 2006), about 70% of mergers are unsuccessful even for the merging
partners. It is therefore important that the competition authorities are cau-
tious when judging the claimed (efficiency) benefits of mergers. This implies
a difference between what we call a procedural and a conceptual choice of
welfare standard. Besanko and Spulber (1993) argue that it is better for the
competition authority to concentrate on maximising consumer utility as a
procedural measure, because of information asymmetry between the com-
panies and the competition authority. This would provide the best guaran-
tee that total utility is improved (as a conceptual choice). Concentrating on
consumer surplus balances the information asymmetry between the econo-
mic agents and the competition authority. For large, complex or internatio-
nally integrated economies in particular, it appears that the consumer welfare
standard achieves higher total welfare than the direct application of the total
welfare standard (Renckens (2007)). Neven and Ro¨ller (2005) argue that
maximising consumer utility by competition authorities can be defended
because companies have many more possibilities for lobbying than consumers.
If lobbying is common practice, maximising consumer surplus adds to the
maximising of total welfare. This is also an important reason for competition
authorities to maximise consumer utility. Whether this is the best approach
depends on the specific characteristics of the case. The level of transparency
of the market process and the predictability of the procedures are the main
reasons for deciding whether a total welfare standard should be taken as a
guideline or whether there are arguments for using the consumer surplus as a
policy guideline. If the merging company is big or if efficiencies as a result of
merging companies are not easy to prove, maximising the consumer surplus
is recommended (see also Pittman (2007)). A practical argument for using
consumer surplus as a guideline is put forward by Werden (1996). He shows
that it is much easier for a competition authority to concentrate on consu-
mer surplus than on some other welfare measurement. The consumer surplus
is easy to define, requires small adjustment costs and is also easy to communi-
cate. For these reasons, most competition authorities chose maximising consu-
mer surplus as one of their main policy goals.
3 MACRO-ECONOMIC CALCULATIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF MORE COMPETITION
In this section, we will present an overview of studies which are concerned
with calculations of the effects of competition, deregulation and sector control
on macro indicators (GDP Growth, employment growth and productivity).
Table 1 shows different studies which calculate the effects of deregulation and
more competition on economic development in different countries and/or in
different sectors. Some calculations are made for a specific country; other cal-
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culations are for a number of EU or OECD countries. Some studies look
into specific sectors (e.g. airlines), while others compare outcomes of different
sectors through a cross-section. The table should be read as follows. Column
2 presents the specific policy measure(s) to increase competition. Column 3
gives the period considered. In column 4 we summarize the research method
and indicate the country (countries) or sector(s) studied. Many of the studies
use a model; others simply use regression analysis. Almost all the studies are
empirical. Columns 5, 6 and 7 give the outcome in terms of growth, employ-
ment and productivity.
The differences in outcome between the studies are obvious. Still it is clear
that the studies all show a positive impact of more competition on growth
and employment. The outcome on growth varies between an annual increase
ranging between 0.5 and 1.1% (Waasdorp et al. (1994) and a cumulated
effect over the years of around 3% (Nieuwenhuijsen and Nijkamp (2001) and
OECD (2005)). In most studies, the productivity was found to increase.
The impact of more competition on growth and employment varies for dif-
ferent reasons. Firstly, the outcome depends on the economy’s specific state of
competition at the start of deregulation and policies to increase more compe-
tition. For instance, until 1998 companies in the Netherlands were allowed to
make agreements on prices and division of the market as long as these agree-
ments were reported to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The change in this
policy following the introduction of the new competition law gave a strong
impetus to competition. The marginal addition to the outcome of more dere-
gulation will decline in situations in which an economy is already competi-
tive.11 Secondly, the outcome effect depends on the specific policy measure
under consideration. A policy to stimulate the functioning of the product
markets will be more effective when the deregulation of government activi-
ties is implemented at the same time. Deregulation in some markets combi-
ned with strong government interventions in other markets will undermine
the total effectiveness of a policy to stimulate more competition. Also dere-
gulation in the product market will be more effective in an economy with a
flexible labour market.12 Thirdly, it is important to distinguish between the
short term effects of more competition and the medium or longer term out-
come of improving the competitive climate in a country. The effect in the
longer term must include the impact of competition on innovation as well.
Therefore the OECD (2005, p. 2) states:
“As the analysis is confined to a relatively narrow set of policies and
abstracts from potential dynamic effects from reform-induced increase
11 In New Zealand the structural adjustments at the end of the 1980s were very successful
because many government interventions prevented it from growing in the decade before.
12 See van Bergeijk et al. (1997) and Jonsson (2006).
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Figure 1 – Consumer surplus and producer surplus
in innovation, the overall gains from broad reforms could be signifi-
cantly higher than reported in the paper”. . .
All studies surveyed show that an increase in competition by deregulation
or privatisation leads to an increase in GDP and employment growth. The
effects vary from an increase in the annual growth rate to an overall cumula-
ted effect on economic growth. In most cases, long term productivity will also
increase. Furthermore, the context in which the introduction of more compe-
tition is placed has an influence on the magnitude of the effects.
4 ESTIMATING THE OUTCOME OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT
BY THE NMa
Since 2004 the NMa publishes estimates of the gains in consumer surplus
resulting from the enforcement of competition law and sector specific control
(electricity). A consumer surplus calculation combines the impact on prices
and output. The published figures are calculations of the gains in consumer
surplus at micro level and are based on individual decisions.13 In order to
estimate the static outcome effects of interventions by the NMa, the office
of the Chief Economist calculates the static consumer savings on an annual
basis.
The method used is illustrated in Figure 1. It provides a simple illustration
of how a change in the consumer surplus is estimated for a specific NMa case.
13 See the annual reports of 2005 and 2006 of the NMa for a description of the method
used to calculate the micro level effects.
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The demand curve is represented by the straight line acfj. The breakdown of
a cartel will lead to a price reduction from P1 to P0.14 Given the informa-
tion on output before the intervention, it is easy to calculate the direct consu-
mer savings that result from the intervention. In Figure 1, this is the rectangle
dbce. In order to estimate the deadweight loss part of consumer surplus (the
triangle cef), information on the demand elasticity on the specific market is
also needed. Further assumptions for the estimation of the consumer surplus
of antitrust policies are:
• The period under consideration is only the period for which the cartel is
proven;
• The basis for the calculations is only the turnover related to the infringe-
ment and fined companies.
For mergers, the following assumptions for the calculations are made:
• Mergers should be “prohibited” by the authority or there should be infor-
mation that they have been postponed due to interventions and remedies
proposed by the NMa;
• The projected price increase which is prevented by the NMa intervention is
estimated to be 1%.
The OFT uses the same assumptions for its outcome calculations for the
UK as those used by the NMa for the Netherlands (see OFT (2005)). The
assumptions are considered to be conservative, in that they are unlikely to
overestimate the gains in consumer surplus from competition law enforce-
ment.
In order to estimate the outcome effects of regulation in the energy
transport sector, the NMa computes the difference between the actual price
increase for energy transport and the annual price increase of the consumer
price. This price difference is multiplied with the turnover of the sector at the
beginning of the period considered.
These three calculations (for cartels, mergers and energy regulation) toge-
ther yield the estimated static outcome effects of the enforcement of the com-
petition law and of regulation in the energy sector.
In the period 1998–2007, the total increase in the consumer surplus
as a result of the NMa interventions is estimated at about C 4.2 billion.
Of this figure, about 50% of the outcome must be attributed to antitrust
14 The price decrease is based on case specific information. If no further information is avai-
lable, it is assumed that the cartel had a price effect of at least 1% (see OFT (2005) and Wer-
den (2008), in this issue).
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policies, about 45% to energy regulation and only about 5% to merger
control. This has to do with the specific assumptions made in order to avoid
over-estimating the impact of the NMa interventions.
However, these outcome calculations only measure the static effects of law
enforcement in one case or sector. The spillover to other companies and sec-
tors is not included. Also the fact that consumers might switch to other pro-
ducts which become relatively cheaper and might compensate the primary loss
in the specific market are not included in this simple method.
Furthermore, short term calculations at micro level do not distinguish bet-
ween short term and long term effects of law enforcement. It is possible that
a company’s short term dominant position is accepted for the time being, in
order to increase the net value of the consumer surplus over the whole life
cycle of the product. Note that this may imply a fall in the consumer surplus
in the short term, benefiting the producer. These dynamic effects are often
used as an argument by opponents of competition policies and deregulation
to criticise the calculation of the consumer surplus. As soon as we switch
from pure micro short term effects to the macro dynamic effects, they expect
the outcome effects will change dramatically (Kolnaar (2004)).
In order to obtain a more balanced view of the dynamic effect of inter-
ventions and competition law enforcement, we feel it is important to make
simulations with a model which also includes the dynamics of market equi-
libriums in the long run. For such calculations, we use a general equilibrium
model called MESEMET-2 (See van Bergeijk et al. (1997) and van Sinderen
and Donselaar (2000)). A common characteristic of MESEMET models is
that they are well equipped to estimate the macro-economic impact of micro-
economic interventions which do have an effect on the wedge between gross
and net income (See van Sinderen (1990)). MESEMET-2 is a general equi-
librium model. It is a supply side model with explicit modelling of the tax
wedge on labour income, with a labour market and a simple capital mar-
ket as well as technological progress. In MESEMET-2, equilibrium is obtai-
ned by maximising consumer welfare and business profits. The structure of
MESEMET-2 is embedded in micro economic behaviour. A representative
company maximises profits in a situation of perfect competition. This maxi-
misation process leads to the factor demand relations. In the model, two
types of economic agents are distinguished: capital owners and employees,
who decide on their labour supply. Both types maximise their utility functions
under a budget restriction. The utility function of the employees contains
consumption and leisure as arguments. The utility function of the capital
owner contains a balanced approach between future consumption and current
consumption. Their income depends on the rate of return on investment. In
MESEMET-2, it is assumed that there are two types of possible investments:
shares and bonds.
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The government can tax both capital and labour income. These taxes lead
to a wedge between gross and net income.15 Labour supply is endogenous in
MESEMET-2 and technological progress is also partly endogenous.
In symbols, the important equation for the purpose of this analyse are:
Ls= f (W′n)+A (1)
W′n=W−1.5 Ti (2)
W=Pl−P (3)
dPl=dP+dH+0.25 dTi−B (4)
Ld=ZYd−0.55 Wy+C (5)
Wy=Pl−Py (6)
Py=g (P) (7)
P=h ((Y+Py) ; (L+Pl)) (8)
L=k (Ls,Ld) (9)
In this part of the model, we define Ls as labour supply and Ld as labour
demand. The actual employment (L) is determined by both labour demand
and labour supply. Labour supply depends on the real net wage rate (W′n);
labour demand on the real gross wage costs (Wy). The influence of direct and
indirect taxes (Tc) on the real gross wage rate is defined in equation 2. The
real wage rate itself is defined in equation 3. Equation 4 describes the nominal
wage rate growth. The consumer price is defined in equation 8; production
prices are defined in equation 7. All variables are in growth rates. Bold faced
symbols are “other variables”.
Carlton (1996) already made it clear that the remarkable resemblance bet-
ween the theoretical results of macro models which try to model market
power and models which provide insights into the effects of taxation are the
backbone of the macroeconomic calculation of the outcome of policies to
break market power and monopolies.
15 The MESEMET model is structured so that taxes on capital are equivalent to corporate
taxes and taxes on labour are equivalent to income taxes. The net capital income is included
in the total income of the consumer which is taxed through income taxation. Therefore the
simulation of market power is comparable to a tax on labour income.
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Carlton (1996, p. 3): “taxes create a wedge between price and margi-
nal costs in the same way that market power creates a wedge. It is this
“wedge” that drives most of the interesting results in the macro litera-
ture dealing with imperfect competition.”
So market power leads to a wedge which can be compared to the tax wedge.
Browning (1994) shows that regulation has the same characteristic. In his
opinion, regulation leads to a “non-tax wedge”, which also has the same cha-
racteristics as a tax-wedge.
On the non-tax wedge, Browning wrote:
“[. . . ] there are a large number of non-tax phenomena that have
the effect of reducing input prices below marginal value products,
just as do taxes on income. . . . These include such things as mono-
poly, monopsony. . . and many forms of business regulation.” (Brow-
ning (1994), p. 419).
Matheron (2002) proves that in an endogenous growth model, the wel-
fare costs of monopolistic competition can be substantially higher than in
the static case when a conscientious decision making process is assumed. He
concludes:
“Notice that from a formal point of view, the effects of monopolis-
tic competition are similar to those deriving from a constant tax on
income associated with lump-sum transfers. This analogy first shows
that the estimates which were derived here are not completely surpri-
sing” (Matheron (2002), p. 132).
The specific characteristics of MESEMET allow us to estimate the effects
of government interventions aimed at reducing market power and fighting
cartels. Imbalances and execution of market power in the product market are
transferred to the labour market by means of the wedge between the gross
and the net income as a result of market distortions. In principle, this is the
same mechanism as the influence of taxation. Therefore tackling a market dis-
tortion can be interpreted as a cut in the non-tax wedge which is the result
of imperfect competition and which has the same characteristics as the tax
wedge.
In order to compensate the income effects of the cuts in the tax wedge,
the cut in the tax wedge on labour income which leads to an increase in net
income of the consumer must be compensated by a lump sum transfer of tax
money from the consumer to the government.
Table 2 presents the macro-economic effects of competition law enforce-
ment and sector specific regulation by the competition authorities. It shows
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TABLE 2 – EFFECTS CALCULATED BY MESEMET-2 OF A REDUCTION IN THE
MARKET POWER WEDGE OF 0.75% OF GDP
Period 1 5 10 20 Long
term
Macro-economic variables
Export 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
Consumption 0.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8
Financial balance governmenta 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Investments 2.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
Employment 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Import −0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Price level −0.4 −0.1 −0.1 −0.3 −0.3
Nominal gross wage −0.5 −0.3 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
Welfare index for capital 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0
Welfare index for labour 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Total welfare index 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Profit before tax −0.4 −0.3 −0.4 −0.5 −0.6
Production 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
Production capacity 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
GDP 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Cumulative deviations (in %) of the base model
a Absolute deviation of the base model
that a cut in the non-tax wedge by C 4.2 billion (0.75% of GDP) which is
compensated by a lump sum transfer has a positive effect on growth and
employment. In the long term, production will increase by 0.5%.
Employment increases too: by 0.4%. This implies that productivity grows
by around 0.1% as a result of increasing the competition in the product
market.
These calculations indicate that the benefits in terms of the consumer sur-
plus which is transformed into GDP growth will be higher in the long term
than in the short term. According to these calculations, business profits will
fall as a result of government intervention. However, investments will increase.
The reason for this is that the negative influence of the profits is offset by a
positive effect of output.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In order to estimate the economic effects of competition policy enforcement,
it is important to define what goals the different economic actors try to maxi-
mise. Maximising the consumer surplus is the goal of the competition autho-
rities. Although in some merger cases, arguments of efficiency defence must be
incorporated into the ultimate decision to let a merger pass or not, consumer
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welfare is the most important goal in merger cases too. Therefore, consu-
mer savings are the most prominent outcome indicator presented by com-
petition authorities like the US Department of Justice, the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) and the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). Politi-
cians and policy makers are other important stakeholders in the competition
policy arena. Of course they are also interested in the outcome of the enfor-
cement of the competition law, but they have a somewhat broader perspec-
tive. Besides consumer savings, they are often also concerned about the effects
of more competition on economic growth and employment. In this paper, we
try to bridge this gap between the outcome ambitions of competition policy
in terms of welfare gains and consumer surplus and the longer term effects
of competition policy on growth and employment. The following conclusions
can be drawn from this research.
1. Empirical studies on the impact on the economy of introducing more com-
petition show that, in general, more competition leads to more growth and
employment. Sometimes productivity responds positively as well. However,
this also depends on how technological progress is affected by more com-
petition in the product market. Most studies do not report simultaneously
on the effects on consumer surplus and on economic growth.
2. In the Netherlands, enforcement of the competition law has had a very
positive effect on the static consumer surplus during the ten years we have
considered in our research. Using conservative assumptions, we estimate
that enforcement of the competition law has increased consumer surplus
by about C 4.2 billion between 1998 and 2007.
3. In estimating the macro-economic dynamic effects of competition law
enforcement, we treat an increase in consumer surplus as a reduction in the
non-tax wedge on labour. This implies that in a macro-economic context,
an increase in consumer welfare can be simulated as a balanced budget
cut in taxation. It is a well known analogy from the literature that market
power or cartels create a wedge between price and marginal costs compa-
rable to that of taxes. This analogy allows us to calculate the effects of the
enforcement of competition law in a model in which taxation is the driving
force of distortions of government policies.
4. NMa policies over the 1998–2007 are estimated to have had a positive
effect on production of 0.5%. This estimate is based on the estimated
increase in consumer surplus and hence rests on the same conservative
assumptions.
5. Employment growth will also respond positively to an increase in competi-
tion. According to our estimates, this effect is around 0.4%. Consequently,
the effect on labour productivity is around 0.1%.
In this paper, we have shown how micro-economic calculations can be used to
obtain macro-economic estimates which are relevant to the political debate on
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competition and competition law enforcement. The main conclusion is that
enforcement of the competition law has positive effects on consumer welfare
and in the long term also on economic growth, employment growth and pro-
ductivity.
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